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Introduction 
1. In July 1975 the Commission submitted to the Council the Proposed Pluri-
annual Programme of the Community for the years 1976/80 in the field of 
Controlled Thermonuclear Fusion and Plasma Physics. This proposed 
programme included the work, in association with the Commission, of 
all the laboratories of the member States active in this field as well 
as the construction phase of the JET project. 
The Council, at its session of 15 December 1975, could not 
reach any decision on this proposed programme, due essentially to the 
difficulties connected with the choice of the site for the construction 
of JET. 
In January 1976 the Commission submitted to the Council a Communication 
on the JET site in which after an analysis of all the aspects of the 
problem it pointed out that the site should be Ispra and asked the 
Council to take a position on this choice. 
The Council, at its session of 24 February 1976, did not take 
any position on the choice of the site made by the Commission and 
did not approve the JET project. It approved for a 
period of five years the Community fusion programme with the exception 
of the JET project on the basis of an overall budget of 124 MUA, but 
provisionally restricted the implementation of this programme to 1976 
with an appropriation of 20.8 MUA pending a final decision on the JET 
project. At the same session the Council agreed on Frid~ 18 June as 
the date for its next meeting to be given over to further examination 
of the Commission proposals on the JET project and its communications 
on siting. 
2. During the Council sessions of 15 December and 24 February, and during 
the preceding discussions, concern has been expressed on the scientific 
objectives on the technical and financial aspects and on the management 
structures of the project. The Consultative Committee for Fusion dis-
cussed all these matters at the request of the Commission during its 
meetings of 5 April and 17 May 1976 and adopted unanimously the Opinion 
which is given in the Annex. 
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The Commission had agreed to provide further and up-to-date information 
on these matters, and is accordingly submitting this document to the 
Council. 
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Chapter I SCIENI'IFIC STATUS 
1. The essential objective of JET i• to obtain and study a plasma in condi-
tions and dimensions approaching those needed in a thermonuclear reactor. 
This objective involves four main areas of wol'k : 
(i) The scaling of plasma behaviour as parameter• approach the reactor ra~e 
(ii) the plasma-wall interaction in these conditions 
(iii)the study of plasma heating and 
(iv) the study of alpha-particle production, confineaent and consequent 
plasma heating. 
In the conceptual design phase it was assumed that the induced current is 
the figure of merit of a tolcamak. For a. given co•t and stress limit in 
copper, this led to the following main characteristics of the device: 
large volume, low aspect ratio, relatively lov magnetic field and D-shaped 
copper coils. It should be noted that this choice is compatible with the 
assumption of different ~otheses on the fi,ure of merit. 
2. Three large projects comparable to JET are in progress in the world 
TF'I'R in the USA, T-20 in the USSR and J!'-60 in Japano Two of them 
(TFTR and JT-60) have adopted rather different options fro• JmT : smaller 
volume, larger aspect ratio, higher magnetic field, circular stainless 
steel supported copper coils. The third (T-20) is more similar to JET 
although considerably larger. Some variation• between experiments of 
this generation can be considered as an advant~ for the world programmee 
3. Such a large and expensive project, lasting 7 to 8 years from the begin-
ning of design to the starting of operation has inevitably some inertia in 
particular in the definition of the main characteristics which cannot be changed 
without introducing several years of delay and large suppleaentary costs$ All 
successive fluctuations in scientific opinions on the criteria for the choice 
between the main options cannot be fully taken into account. Consequently a 
maximum of flexibility mu.st be allowed for in the design, and this was the 
case for JET from the very beginning of the conceptual design phase. 
Due to the design choices made it is possible to operate JET in a wide range 
of plasma dimensions and in a variety of cross-sections: from circularity 
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to rather pronounced ellipticity. In addition to the ability to utilize 
Neutral Injection and Radio Frequency Heating, provision has been made for 
the application of Adiabatic Compression Heating. 
4. The main options of the JET design are based, as we have already said, on 
the hypothesis that the current is the figure of merit of a tokamak. 
The clarification of this assumption is one of the major aims of JET. The 
main uncertainties concern. the validity of its extrapolation to plasma regimes ex-
pected in a thermonuclear reactor and impossible to achieve in the present generatio:n 
devices. These uncertainties are connected in particular to the role of the 
impurities in the plasma and even more to the behaviour of the loss mechanisms. 
The assumption of the current as the figure of merit leaves some freedom 
in the choice between large volume - low field and small volume - high field 
solutions. 
5. The results obtained at the end of 1975 on the machines ALCATOR at the 
l~ (high magnetic field, large aspect ratio, small volume) and PULSATOR 
at Garching (low magnetic field, large aspect ratio, small volume) show 
that in a very clean plasma it is possible to increase considerably the 
plasma density n, without important changes in temperature and current. 
In these conditions the confinement time t increases too, so that the 
quality of the confinement defined as nt increases substantially. It is 
unclear whether the improvements in density and confinement are two conse-
quences of a same cause or if the improvement of the confinement is a conse-
quence of the increase in density. The latter hypothesis should suggest 
higher fields allowing higher densities, but the extrapolation of these 
phenomena to reactor regimes is far from being granted. 
On the other hand preliminary results on T-10 (Moscow) which can be considered 
a scaled-up version of T-3 by a factor 2 in linear dimensions, show that 
operation with magnetic field and plasma parameters comparable with T-3 
gives increased current and an improvement in confinement time by a factor 5· 
This improvement can be attributed to the increase in volume and consequently 
in current. 
6. Although the first group of results mentioned in paragraph 5 might indicate 
that the magnetic fields of JET should be increased and the volume reduced, 
the preliminar,y results on ~10 support retention of the present design of 
JET. 
./5. 
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In any case major changes on the project would involve the loss of two 
to three years and of several MUA. These disadvantages would be unavoid-
able, whereas any modest improvements in the expected performance would 
be hypothetical. Taking into account the clear advantage of some diversity 
in the working regimes of the next generation of tokamaks, one concludes 
that the parameters of JET should remain unchanged. 
1· Discussion of the information mentioned under I-5 has brought increased 
attention to the problem of auxiliary heating to be applied to JET. More 
weight must be giYen to this problem, the solution of which is particularly 
the responsibility of the EUR-cEA and the EUR-UKAEA Associations. 
It is possible that the installation of considerable auxiliary heating power 
(20-30 MW), initially foreseen for the second phase of the JET operation 
(extended performance, around 1983), will be needed already during the 
first phase (basic performance,around 1981), but it will be two to three 
years from now before this need can be assessed. 
8. After re-examining the scientific aims of JET and the choice of its main 
parameters in the light of all up-to-date information, the Commission, 
supported by all its Partners, confirms that the JET design as defined in 
R5* is scientifically sound and well suited to its aims. Consequently, 
the Commission strongly recommends to go ahead with JET as it is, without 
delay. 
* "The JET project design proposal" doe. EUR-JET-R5, which is summarized 
in the brochure "The JET project" doe. ElJR-JET-R?. 
.j6. 
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Chapter II: TECffiHCAL STATUS 
1. One should first recall that in such a project which is ea..atiall7 .. ~ 
periment one camlot defi.M preci• liaita 'betwea the deaip1 the ccariractiOll 
and the operation phases. Some minor i.llproveaents to the deaip ..,- be appropriate 
during the construction and even during the operation phase. 
2. The present status of different elements of the project is indicated 
in the second column of table I. Ia order of increasing completion, 
the indications given are: 
not yet studied 
conceptual design 
design 
final design 
call for tenders re~ 
call for tenders sent 
contract re~ for signature 
contract signed 
Table I shows that the main components of the device, such as the 
toroidal coils, the mechanical structure and the vacuum vessel, are 
the most advanced. The fact that diagnostics, control monitoring and 
data acquisition and additional heating systems are less advanced is 
normal: these items take a shorter time to complete, or need not be 
rea4y until later. 
Two items should by now be in a more advanced state: the buildings 
and the power supplies. According to the planning of the project these 
items are on the critical path: each month of del~ in their completion 
entails a month of del~ in the first operation of the device. On the 
other hand the state of their design is as advanced as it can be in the 
absence of a decision on the site. 
3. The last statement is evident for the buildings. Concerning the power 
supplies, one should recall here that they are site-dependent, as is 
repeatedly stated in R5. ID tact the bailie power aappl.7 saJwwe pwa ill 
R5 and referred to UDd.er point 3 ot table I is operatiaul at 8ZJ¥ ot the 
proposed sites, including the wabri trca the electrical poillt ot view. 
However, the final l•orl will ..,..... Gll tlle aT site pUlic -twark 
characteristics. At ISPRA, for example, no flywheel motor generator set 
would be necessary. * 
*) During the second meeting of the Consultative Committee for Fusion 
(17 May 1976), the British Member stated that this applies now also 
to Culham. 
./1. 
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4. In view of the size and complexity of JET all the partners including the 
Commission considered it prudent to ask for an independent appraisal of 
the technical aspects and cost estimates of the project. For this reason 
the JET Supervisory BOard in Mczy 1975 placed this task on the Engineering 
Division of the Reactor Group (Risley) of the UKAEA. 
This group listed and discussed all foreseeable technical difficulties as 
existing at that time and produced a total~ independent assessment of the 
project. Particular attention was devoted to the final period of operation 
of the device (under radio-active conditions) and to the related problems 
of remote maintenance and repair. 
!et the final oonnl.tation Detwe the JET t- ud. tlaoe I:nd.apedant Aa•a.-t 
Team (IAT) in April 1976, the two parties jointly stated that •ror the 
majority of the questions raised by the IAT the answers of the JET team were 
agreed to be adequate, taking into account also the progress in the design 
and development in the year since R5 was issued", and that "the relatively 
minor divergencies which remain after the discussions are more matters of 
opinion than factual differences". 
The Consultative Committee for Fusion has expressed its satisfaction about 
the careful and independent assessment of the project produced by the IAT 
and about the outcome of the final consultation (see point b. of the 
ANNEX). 
In the Commission's opinion, too, this represents a satisfactory outcome. 
The few points remaining open should be handled by the JET Management Com-
mittee as the project proceeds. 
5. After examining the up-to-date technical status of the project and the results 
of the final confrontation between the JET team and the Independent Assessment 
Team, the Commission concludes that the project is technically sound and 
feasible. The present state of the design allows passing immediately to the 
construction phase, except for the power supplies and buildings which are on 
the critical path and whose design cannot be finalized as long as the site 
is undecided. 
.jB. 
Items 
1. JET Device 
Mechanical Structure 
Toroidal Magnet 
Magnetic Circuit 
Poloidal Field Windings 
Vacuum Vessel 
Miscellaneous, Transport 
Long Delivery Items 
(funds released during 
the design phase) 
20% Contingency 
Subtotal 
2. Auxiliary Systems 
Pumping System 
Cooling Systems 
Assembly and 
Maintenance System 
-8-
rrechnical Status 
(March 1976) 
(see page 6) 
Final Design 
Contracts placed 
Final Design 
Final Design 
Copper conductors: 
contract placed 
Call for tender 
sent 
Contract placed 
Design 
Design 
Design 
Design 
TABLE I ( i) 
Status of the cost estimate 
Cost (MUA) 
March 1975 
2.8 
7.7 
3.9 
4-5 
5-5 
2.3 
-2.5 
4-9 
29.1 
2.0 
0.6 
1.4 
Basis 
of the 
estimate 
{see 
page 11) 
Comparison 
3 Study 
contracts 
2 Study 
contracts 
Comparison 
2 Study 
contracts 
Rigid sectors: 
3 Stu~ contracts 
Bellows: 3 
Study contracts 
Ports, Limiters: 
Comparison 
Estimation 
Devoted to study 
contracts and 
prototype work 
2 Study contracts 
Comparison 
5o% on one 
study contract 
5o% on comparison 
./( ii). 
• 
• 
Items 
Additional Heating System 
(including its Power 
Supplies) 
20'% Contingency 
Subtotal 
3. Power Supplies 
Toroidal Field PS (one 
static unit, one flywheel 
motor generator set) 
Poloidal Field PS (one 
flywheel MG set, circuits) 
Auxiliary PS 
20% Contingency 
Subtotal 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~ 
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Technical Status 
(Harch 1976) 
(see page 6) 
Conceptual Design 
(not yet site-
optimized) 
Final design 
Call for tender 
re~ for MG sets 
Not yet studied 
4. Control, Monitoring, Data Acquisition 
Computers and Peripherpls ) 
Computer station and ) Conceptual ) Design 
connections ) 
201~ Contingency 
Subtotal 
5. Dia~ostics (Basic) 
Only preliminary 
Subto1tal studies 
6. Operating Budget 
Subtotal 
TABLE I ( ii) 
Status of the cost estimate 
Cost (HUA) 
Ivlarch 1975 
3.5 
1. 5 
Q.O 
8.1 
9.7 
1.0 
3.7 
22.5 
1. 9 
1. 0 
0.6 
3.5 
3.5 
7.6 
-----
Basis 
of the 
estimate 
{see 
page 11) 
Comparison 
4 Stu~ contracts 
Idem plus compari-
son and estimation 
for the circuits 
Estimation 
Comparison 
Comparison 
Comparison 
Estimation 
.. /(iii). 
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Items Technical Status Status of the cost estimate 
7. Buildings 
Specific JET Buildings 
including 12% Contingency 
Rented Buildings 
Subtotal 
8. Manpower 
1224 Man/years 
18% Overhead Services 
Travel 
Subtotal 
9· Reserve 
(March 1976) 
(see Pa&e 6) 
Final Design (site 
independent parts) 
Cost (MUA) 
March 1975 
15.3 
1. 3 
16.6 
26.4 
4.7 
0.8 
31.9 
11.3 
GRAND TOTAL 13 5 MU A 
==================================================== 
Basis 
of the 
estimate 
{see 
Pace 11) 
1 Study contract 
Estimation 
Average Euratom 
Salaries 
Comparison 
Comparison 
• 
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Clapter III : Sr.gnU§ 0f fEE CO§f E§II}âé-
L. The oosü of JEI up to its basic performanoe ras estlnÈted at 135 MUA as
inôicated. in B!. llhis ras calculated. at lbrch 1975 prices in 3eLg'ian
Francs using the free nar*et ercbange rates, a,ncl tbea converted. to units
of account acoorr[ing to the officia]. rate : 50 BF = I UÀ.
The basls on nhlch the cost of eaah elEuent is estim.ted.ris given in the
fourüh oolum of table I.
llhe neaning of the key ror{s ueed. is the foI3-oring :
StucLy oontracts : ooupleted Joint feasibility antl cost estiuates stuôies
perPoruetl ia inôustrY.
Coullarisoa
Estination
: oonpsrative estinates (sonetiæs ertrapolatect) based.
on sfunlIar eqpipneat usetl rlthin the association§ or
otber organizations.
: estlm.tes fron techuioal tLata a,nô general experience.
Concenriag the thtr{ oolnm of table I, the §rbtotaLs are the same that
were gâ.ver in the rl.oanrnert nD (pagg 566), rith the exception of a.n increase
of 1.3 ItgA ia the expenditure urder the iten Builttingsl counterbalanceù
by a lorer provision for the operatlon phase tlue to its shorter dr:ration
ritbin the ?6180 pmgr'amer a,§ a con§equence of èe1-a3rs. The grand
totaL of 135 HIIA is rmc,bangeô.
2. 1[be IntLepead.eat AEsesment Team origi.nally estiæted that the cost of the
ooastnrstiæ phase exceeÔeô the JB! tean esti'nate (fl5 UUe) ty 23 IdUÀ.
Àfter ctiEsgssion, the JEE tean and. the LÀT' duriug the fiaal confrontation
heIô oa 29 aûd,3o Àprt1 L97û agreett the follordng joint statement : 'rThe
general clisslrssioas shoreô a very gootl agreement ou cogts and. nanpower.
Tbe cost estinate of the L[1[ for the congtnrstloa of the project in 5 ÿears
as proposed. in R! exceeôs the JEI estinate by only 5 UUA. This clifference
is aot stgaifi.cant.
qhe LÀT estiraate of 6 years for the consüruction phase ls clue to a mo:re
cautious approach ia ribioh protot;rpes ale conpletely testetl before series
proôusüion begins. l3his ertra tlne ri1l cost approximtel.y an adclitional
6o5 MrÂtt. 1he Comission points out tbat these d.iscrepancies are covered.
alnost eæctIy by the Resere (tten ÿ of table I).
./tz
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3. Concerning the cost of the operation phase, it can be reasonably foreseen 
that an operation period of 5 years, including shut-down times required to 
prepare for extended performance, will be needed to achieve the aims • 
of JET stated in Chapter I. The staff during operation will be comparable 
in numbers to that working during the final year of construction. On 
this basis the personnel cost would be about 40 MUA. 
The capital cost of achieving the extended performance will be about 
40 MUA as stated in R5. This includes the cost of supplementary auxiliary 
heating (15-20 MUA). As pointed out in 1.7 of this document, the need 
will probably arise to commit some of this money during the 5 year program-
me but this need cannot be assessed now. 
The operating costs including tritium operation are estimated at about 50 MUA. 
One can tentatively conclude that, as is usual for experiments of comparable 
size, the annual operating cost is similar to the average annual construction 
cost. 
4. The grand total of 135 MUA for the construction phase will certainly be 
affected by inflation. 
Concerning salaries, according to the hypothesis assumed in R5 (temporary 
Euratom positions at March 75), one can say that, on the basis of the 
scale of salaries approved by the Council in November 1975, the increase 
at April 76 would be about 4 MUA to be added to the 135 MUA. 
Concerning the other items, it is extremely difficult to give similar 
indications. On the one hand one can expect an increase of costs in general, 
and most contracts include inflation clauses. On the other hand the 
competition between different firms and some fluctuations in the prices 
of raw materials can result in a cost reduction for some items. The 
situation is best illustrated by Table !I showing a comparison between 
initial estimates and offers from industry for the cases in which contracts 
are ready for signature or have already been placed. 
5· After examining the present status of the project cost estimate, and the 
final position of the Independent Assessment Team, the Commission continues 
to accept the estimate of 135 MUA for construction based on March 1975 prices. 
Allowance must be made for the effects of variations in the economic 
situation. The only way to face this difficulty is to propose again to 
the Council to adopt a financing system taking into account, year by year, 
the economic situation, on the basis of proposals of the Commission with 
precise justifications. 
./13. 
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Items for which contracts are rea;dy for signature 
TY£e of expenditure 
or have been placed 
Offer from Industry 
(JilUA at stated date) 
TABLE II 
Estimates 
(I'-1UA March 75) 
===~======================================================================= 
Copper for 
toroidal coils 
Iv'!anufacture of 
toroidal coils 
Bellows 
Copper for outer 
poloidal coils 
1.8 February 76 
3. 6 April 76 
0.8 January 76 
0. 3 March 76 
6.5 * 
*) The legal commitments of the CommissioB, in accordance with 
2.1 
4-9 
0.54 
o.s 
8.04 
the decisions of the Council, cover only the purchase of proto-
types for a total amount of about 1.2 MUA whilst the cOIIIJJiitments 
of the contractors, corresponding to this total of 6.5 MUA, 
cover the supply of complete sets. All the contracts include 
inflation clauses. 
./14. 
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Chapter IV THE ORGAUIZATION AND :MA.NAGEMENT OF THE JET PROJECT 
1) General principles 
The scientific and engineering complexity of JET, together with its 
size and cost, demand a strong but flexible form of management organiza-
tion, in which decisions can be taken and executed without delays. 
This management should therefore have full financial and contractual, 
as well as technical and operational responsibility for the Project. 
Moreover, an effective and continuous interaction must be established 
between the Project and the associated laboratories who should be 
strongly involved in and committed to the Project and consider it 
as a common venture. 
The JET Project will be clearly distinct from the host organization 
and its activities, and in the provision of administrative or other 
supporting services from the latter a clear interface must be defined 
in detail to avoid duplication and blurring of responsibility. 
2) Management structure 
The management structure has already been agreed by the Partners 
and the Commission, and includes representation of all Partners and 
the Commission at all levels of the management. A JET COUNCIL will 
be established for overall general management, a JET MANAGEMENT 
COMMITTEE will be responsible for the direct management. 
There is a HEAD OF PROJECT with adequate delegated powers to direct 
the execution of the project, assisted by senior managers and the 
PROJECT TEAM. Both the JEI' Council and the Management Committee are 
being formed. 
3) Legal form 
To meet the requirements in point l utilizing the agreed management 
structure in point 2 several alternative legal forms of organization 
could be adopted. One is a JET Association formed by an Agreement 
signed by all Partners including EURATOM, legal acts being carried 
out by the latter on behalf of all the Partners. Another is to set 
up an independent legal entity for the JET Project which would 
itself carry out all the legal acts required. 
- 15 -
In accordance tvi th the Commission choice of Ispra, the JET Association 
as described above is considered the most suitable form. 
4) Budget 
\·Jhichever form of organization is selected, 
a) the funds contributed by the Commission and the Partners, taken 
together, will form the JET Project budget to be at the disposal 
of the JET management, and to be managed independently from the 
budgets of the Commission and the Partners, 
b) the FINANCIAL REGULATIONS applicable to the Project Hill include 
the authorities for commitments and payments within the budget, 
a budgetary control system, procedures for inventories and auditing, 
and procedures for awarding contracts to industry ensuring full 
competition on a Community basis. 
5) Staffing 
The Project Team will be composed of staff seconded by the host Partner, 
the other Partners, and coming from other sources. 
The Commission proposes to recruit the staff of the Project Team as 
temporary agents of the Community to temporary posts. 
6) Involvement of Industry 
Industry vlill contribute to the project mainly under contracts awarded 
by the JET management for supply of materials and services, construction 
of buildings and components, etc. The involvement of inudstry in any 
consultant capacity must be a matter for consideration and decision by 
the JET management • 
./ 16. 
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Chapter V: URGENCY OF THE FINAL DECISION 
1. It is fully recognized that each month of del~ in the final decision 
including the site entails one month of del~ in the first operation of 
the device. The design of at least two site-dependent elements of the project 
(buildings and power supplies) will be suspended as long as the site is 
unknown. 
It is possible to carry on some other work, but this will not reduce the 
final del~. This delB3 would, in any case, imrolve supplementary expenditure 
at least to cover the salaries. 
If buildings are retarded too long some large hardware m~ be delivered 
before the appropriate buildings for testing and assembling are available. 
This would result in an embarrassing and costly storage problem, and could 
invalidate the manufacturer's guarantees. 
2. Besides JET the whole fusion programme is strongly affected and hindered 
by del~ in the decision on the JET site. The programme of four of the 
largest Associations are technically and financially conditioned by this 
decision. Each of these programmes includes the construction of an inte~ 
mediate size device whose design is practically complete. TEXTOR would not 
be built if JET was at Ji.il ich, 'IDRUS 2 would possibly be built at Cadarache 
instead of Fonten~-au.x-Roses if JET was at Cadarache, HBS would not be 
built if JET was at Garching, and the compatibility of building HBTX 2 
if JET were at Culham has not yet been assessed. 
3. The success of a new experiment such as JET is largely determined by the 
enthusiasm of the team which is in charge of it. It is evident that re-
peated deley-s are increasingly discouraging for the staff. This makes it 
difficult to keep the team at its present level, and almost impossible to 
increase it as required. 
The construction of JET requires also a real cooperative effort from the 
industries involved. One cannot expect a full commitment to be undertaken 
as long as the final decision is lacking. 
Within the fusion programme of the Community the cooperative atmosphere is 
jeopardized by the lack of decision on the JET site. Any initiative is a 
priori suspected to be motivated by selfish interests more or less directly 
connected with this problem. 
Outside the Community the credibility of the fusion programme is rapidly 
decreasing. As was pointed out in the meeting of the Fusion Power Coordinating 
Committee of the lEA on 6 April 1976, collaborative planning with the 
Community is hindered by the weakness of our decision-making procedures • 
. Jn. 
- 17 -
In fact, it is extremely difficult to understand why a project on which 
agreement is unanimous is del~ed again and again due to the difficulty 
of choosing the site. 
4. The consequences of choosing a site for JET and the weight of interests 
involved are not so wide and important as to justify long-continued dis-
cussions, hesitations and repeated delays. The Commission stresses again 
that JET is only one of several important steps to be achieved on the w~ 
to the fusion reactor. 
5. Any decision to carr,y on the work on the JET project without knowing the 
site would be not only unrealistic but also dangerous: it could entail 
technical mistakes and useless supplementary expenditure. It would be 
difficult, for example, to avoid placing orders for power supply components 
which might turn out to be unsuitable or even unnecessar,r for the site 
finally chosen. One would be brought to produce detailed designs of the 
buildings in several versions, more or less optimized for different sites. 
Since only one design would finally be utilized, this work would represent 
a waste of manpower and money. 
6. In conclusion the Commission does not see how one could avoid that the 
further del~ in the final decision implied in any temporary solution will 
result in similar additional del~ in the first operation of the device. 
On the contrary, any temporary solution would present serious drawbacks. 
Moreover the Commission does not see any advantage in letting months go 
by before finding a solution to the site problem. The Commission therefore 
urges the Council to take a final and complete decision on JET without 
further del~. 
./18. 
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Chapter VI: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ON THE CHOICE OF THE SITE 
No essential new argument has arisen on this matter, nevertheless the 
information given below might be useful. 
1. During the discussions which preceded the Council meeting of 24 February 
1976 and in the last few months the Commission has realized that the 
importance of the criterion of power supplies had been underemphasized 
in its Communication to the Council on the JET site (Doe. COM(76) 8 final). 
In fact if the power supplied to JET is directly drawn from the network, 
this must not only be able to supply a very high power level but also to 
withstand large frequent and rapid load variations and other abnormal load 
characteristics required for the regular operation of JET. 
From this point of view Ispra, which is directly supplied by a line 
connecting a thermal with a hydroelectric power station, is in an ex-
ceptionally good position in Europe, and in by far the best position 
compared with all the other proposed sites. 
It should be recalled here that the only practicable alternative to the 
direct supply of power from the network is the construction of several 
expensive motor flywheel generator sets. The increased attention devoted 
to the problem of auxiliary heating, which will require extra power (see 
point 1 of chapter I), adds further weight to the power supply arguments. 
2. The importance of power supplies is also illustrated by the criteria 
applied in the search for the site of T-20 (USSR). The first condition 
is the full-time availability of 2000 MW of electric power; moreover, an 
adequate cooling water capacity should be available at the site. It is 
rumoured that T-20 is to be built at CHATURA, about 120 km from Moscow, 
in a power station, near a focal point of the electric power network. 
No research centre exists in the vicinity of this site. For the Japanese 
large tokama.k JT-60 the search for a site is being limited within a radius 
of 30 km from a focal point of the power network. 
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3. An essential requirement for the Community character of the project 
is the international composition of the team. Therefore the site must 
offer all the characteristics and facilities necessary to meet this 
requirement. 
4. F1nally the Commission believes that all the statements made in 
its Communication to the Council on the JET site are still fully valid. 
CONCLUSION 
As a conclusion of the foregoing discussion of scientific, technical and 
financial aspects and of the management structure of the project, and taking 
into account the opinion of the Consultative Committee for Fusion on all these 
aspects (see ANNEX), the Commission confirms that there is no reason to delay 
the final decision on the construction pf JET. This decision cannot be taken 
separately from the approval of the choice of the site. Any attempt to justif.y 
a further delay cannot be based on objective scientific, technical, financial 
or management arguments. Any temporar,y solution would be unrealistic and 
present serious drawbacks. 
In the present situation the lack of decision is jeopardizing not only 
the project itself and the implementation of the whole fusion programme, 
but also the credibility of the decision-making capacity of the Community 
Institutions. 
During the Council meetings of 15 December 1975 and 24 February 1976 
no convergence has appeared on any alternative solution to the proposal 
of the Commission. The Commission insists on the objective validity of 
its proposal, and urges the Council to take a final decision on it. 
ANNEX 
OPINION 
of the Consultative Committee for Fusion 
on the JET Project 
Having met in Brussels on 5 April and 17 May 1976, the Consultative 
Committee on Fusion has unanimously adopted the following opinion: 
(a) Scientific status 
The essential objective of JET is to obtain and stu~ a plasma in 
conditions and dimensions approaching those needed in a thermonuclear 
reactor. This objective involves four main areas of work: 
( i) the scaling of plasma behaviour as parameters approach the 
reactor range, 
(ii) the plasma-wall interaction in these conditions; 
(iii) the stu~ of plasma heatiqg, and 
(iv) the stu~ of alpha particle production, confinement and 
consequent plasma heating. 
The CCF underlines that the ultimate goal is to achieve alpha 
confinement and considers that the physical parameters of the 
project, at present knowledge, are in accordance with this goal. 
(b) Technical status 
The CCF commends the Commission and JET project for arranging 
for the JET design to be examined carefully and independently by a 
separate assessment team. The CC F notes that the final consul tat ion 
between the JET team and the Independent Assessment team has produced 
a satisfactory outcome because the broad design has been verified. 
This gives confidence that the machine can be built and operated as 
planned. 
./2. 
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The present state of the design allows the project to pass immediately 
to the construction phase except for consideration of the power supplies 
and buildings whose design cannot be finalized as long as the site is 
undecided. 
(c) Status of the Cost Estimate 
After examination of the present status of the project including the 
final position of the Independent Assessment team on cost estimates 
(which proposed an increase of 5 Mua) the CCF accepts the cost 
estimate for the five year construction phase to be 135 Mua at 
:March 1975 prices. 
The preliminar,y estimate of the CCF is that the costs for a five 
year exploitation phase will be roughly in the same order of 
magnitude. 
The CCF stresses the necessity to provide for a mechanism which 
allows the funding of the project to be adapted to the situation 
of prices and currencies (inflation). 
(d) Structure 
The CCF considers it essential that the structure of the JET project 
must be conceived in such a WCJ3 that it has at its disposal all the 
managerial functions, flexibility and the decision power necessary 
to achieve success. 
To this end, some delegations considered it suitable to have an 
independent legal entity for JET while some delegations supported 
the proposal of the Commission for a JET Association. 
In order to speed up the organization of the JET project and the 
discussion of structural, financial and industrial questions, the 
CCF: 
recommends the Commission to create immediately the JET Council 
and the JET :Management Committee and to ask the Partners to 
nominate the members, in consultation with the Commission • 
. /3. 
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(e) Conclusion 
In summing up its conclusions the CCF strongly recommends the 
realization of the JET project and urges the Council of Ministers 
to take all necessary decisions as early as possible. 
.. 
